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HOW CRIMINAL LAW CAN HELP SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT 
BY 
RENA STEINZOR* 
The nation is experiencing a white collar crime boomlet, if not a 
wave, of offenses that harm public health, jeopardize worker and 
consumer safety, and threaten the environment. Some big cases have 
settled and others are being tried. Still others are under investigation, 
including the notorious Volkswagen (VW) “defeat device” case that 
continues to make news almost every day. Stung by criticism that too-
big-to-fail banks escaped criminal prosecution for the 2008 market 
crash that continues to cause misery in the country, the Department of 
Justice has pledged to indict individual corporate executives whenever 
possible. It has yet to deliver on that promise, but unless Republicans 
retake the White House and carry through on pledges to further 
dismantle the regulatory state, every account of high-profile corporate 
malfeasance will speculate about criminal implications. 
These developments do not represent an idiosyncratic emergence 
of a handful of rogue corporations and executives even as their 
competitors studiously avoid running afoul of the law. Instead, a 
relentless campaign against big government has produced weak to 
nonexistent enforcement as well as widespread corporate disdain for 
regulatory requirements. Without any question, criminal law is the last 
resort. It closes the barn door after the horses have run free, leaving the 
aftermath of an incident to be ameliorated at great cost, often over 
periods of several years. Environmental laws were enacted because of 
similar flaws in the tort system with the goal of preventing injury rather 
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than merely compensating it. Good regulation enforced aggressively to 
prevent harm is always a better choice. But congressional 
conservatives and their industry allies have embarked on a highly 
successful strategy of starving and badgering the agencies—even the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the strongest and most rebellious 
among them—into quiescence. In the vacuum that remains, criminal 
prosecutions, especially of individual senior executives, have a better 
potential to deter violations than the broken regulatory system. 
This Essay explores, contrasts, and compares the two most 
prominent criminal cases that have emerged in the last several years: 
the $4 billion criminal settlement with British Petroleum that resulted 
from the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill and the VW cheat 
device scandal. The similarities between the two cases are chilling. 
They suggest that until and unless the regulatory state is not just 
revived but greatly strengthened, a result that does not seem 
foreseeable in the near-term, criminal prosecution is the best hope for 
people who believe that the government must redouble its efforts to 
preserve natural resources and protect the public health. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The nation is experiencing a white collar crime boomlet, if not a wave, 
of offenses that harm public health, jeopardize worker and consumer safety, 
and threaten the environment. Prosecutors have indicted corporate and 
individual defendants. Some big cases have settled and others are being 
tried. Still others are under investigation, including the notorious 
Volkswagen (VW) “defeat device” case that made front-page news just a few 
days before this talk.1 If 2007 was the “year of the recall,”2 2014 and 2015 
were the “years of the indictment,” with no end in sight. 
 
 1  Coral Davenport & Jack Ewing, VW Is Said to Cheat on Diesel Emissions: U.S. to Order 
Big Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/business/volkswagen-
is-ordered-to-recall-nearly-500000-vehicles-over-emissions-software.html (last visited Feb. 13, 
2016). 
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In the environmental arena, prosecutors have targeted the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion and spill in the Gulf of Mexico (eleven men died and 4.09 
million barrels of crude oil spilled into fragile Gulf ecosystems over an 
agonizing period of eighty-seven days);3 the chemical leak that contaminated 
the drinking water of Charleston, West Virginia (the chemical, 4-
methylcyclohexanemethanol, had never been tested for toxicological effects, 
and though federal and state experts indicated that the water was safe to 
drink, many abstained because it carried a chemical smell);4 and the VW air 
emissions control cheat device scandal (the company installed software in 
eleven million diesel cars sold in the United States and Europe that disabled 
pollution controls during normal driving, causing emissions to exceed safe 
levels by as much as forty percent, depending on driving conditions and 
other factors).5 
In the consumer and worker safety arenas, criminal cases have targeted 
the New England Compounding Center’s shipment of thousands of 
supposedly sterile steroid injects that were in fact contaminated with fungal 
meningitis (sixty-four people died and 751 were severely sickened);6 the 
Upper Big Branch mine collapse (twenty-nine men killed in the worst mine 
disaster in forty years);7 the sale of salmonella-tainted peanut butter (nine 
 
 2  Gene Grabowski, The Year of the Recall Response, FOOD SAFETY MAG., Feb.–Mar. 2008, 
http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazine-archive1/februarymarch-2008/the-year-of-the-
recall-response/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Louise Story & David Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19 
Million Toys Sent from China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/08/15/business/worldbusiness/15imports.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 3  Clifford Krauss, In BP Indictments, U.S. Shifts to Hold Individuals Accountable, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/energy-environment/in-bp-
indictments-us-shifts-to-hold-individuals-accountable.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). For the 
size and scope of the spill, see Bill Trott, U.S. Appeals Ruling on Size of BP Oil Spill, REUTERS, 
Mar. 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/14/us-bp-trial-appeal-idUSKBN0MA0QB 
20150314#yqGdHgOYzUL5mA30.97 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (BP and the U.S. government 
disagree about the size of the spill; 4.09 million barrels is the government figure); see also John 
M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) 
(discussing the 87 days that passed before the spill was under control). 
 4  Michael Wines, Owners of Chemical Firm Charged in Elk River Spill in West Virginia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/us/owners-of-chemical-company-
charged-in-elk-river-spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); U.S. Geological Survey, Chemicals in 
Elk River Spill Lingered Longer, Traveled Farther: USGS Study Provides New Insights, 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=4095&from=rss (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 5  Davenport & Ewing, supra note 1; Andreas Cremer, Volkswagen to Refit Cars Affected by 
Emissions Scandal, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/us-
volkswagen-emissions-plan-idUSKCN0RT0OL20150930#eQjeo9bWh36AcMQ2.97 (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2016). 
 6  Kay Lazar & Todd Wallack, 14 Executives, Staff Charged in Tainted Drug Case, BOS. 
GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/17/feds-arrest-tied-necc- 
closed-pharmacy-blamed-causing-deaths-with-tainted-drugs/24QytISVdaqXDNsSUOsNYJ/ 
story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 14 Indicted in Connection with New 
England Compounding Center and Nationwide Fungal Meningitis Outbreak, Dec. 17, 2014,  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/14-indicted-connection-new-england-compounding-center-and-
nationwide-fungal-meningitis (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 7  Ken Ward Jr., Longtime Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship Indicted, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE-MAIL, Nov. 13, 2014, http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20141113/GZ01/141119629 
10_TOJCI.STEINZOR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2016  3:31 PM 
212 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 46:209 
dead)8 and eggs (at least 1,900 and potentially as many as 56,000 sickened),9 
and listeria-tainted cantaloupe (thirty-three dead);10 and fatal defects in 
millions of cars sold by Toyota11 and General Motors (the company paid 
claims to the families of 124 people, but that number is likely to at least 
double);12 as well as the as-yet unknown number of vehicles that may contain 
exploding Takata airbags (so far, more than an astounding thirty million cars 
have been recalled for that defect alone).13 
Altogether, these cases involve hundreds of deaths, thousands of 
injuries, and billions of dollars in damage to the environment, consumers, 
workers, and, not incidentally, the companies involved. The VW scandal, for 
example, has provoked the company to write off $7.5 billion in anticipation 
of what it will cost to solve the problem.14 
Is the emergence of criminal investigations and indictments an anomaly 
that happened to coalesce without a unifying cause and will vanish just as 
suddenly? My analysis suggests not. These developments are not an 
idiosyncratic emergence of rogue corporations and executives who have 
done their damage while their competitors studiously avoid running afoul of 
the law. Instinctively understanding the inattention to the law occurring at 
some of the biggest companies in the most hazardous industries, the 
 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Peter Galuszka, Safety Last: One of the Most Reprehensible Bosses 
in Recent History is Finally Facing Justice, SLATE, Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/09/don_blankenship_trial_boss_of_massey_duri
ng_upper_big_branch_explosion_ignored.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 8  Dan Flynn, Federal Judge to Sentence Parnell Brothers and Wilkerson on Sept. 21, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS, July 20, 2015, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/07/pca-case-judge-to- 
sentence-parnell-brothers-and-wilkerson-on-sept-21/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (discussing the 
nine deaths that resulted from salmonella-tainted peanut butter).  
 9  Associated Press, Ex-Egg Industry Executives Jailed in Salmonella Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/ex-egg-industry-executives-jailed-in-
salmonella-outbreak.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Colin Woodard, Notorious Egg Seller 
“Jack” DeCoster Gets Jail Time for Salmonella Outbreak, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 13, 
2015, http://www.pressherald.com/2015/04/13/maine-businessman-jack-decoster-gets-jail-for-
selling-tainted-eggs/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 10  U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Colo., Eric and Ryan Jensen Charged with Introducing 
Tainted Cantaloupe into Interstate Commerce, Sept. 26, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/usao-
co/pr/eric-and-ryan-jensen-charged-introducing-tainted-cantaloupe-interstate-commerce (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016); Mary Beth Marklein, Cantaloupe Farmers Get No Prison Time in Disease 
Outbreak, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/28/ 
sentencing-of-colorado-cantaloupe-farmers/4958671/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 11  Bill Vlasic & Matt Apuzzo, Toyota Is Fined $1.2 Billion for Concealing Safety Defects, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/business/toyota-reaches-1-2-
billion-settlement-in-criminal-inquiry.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 12  Tom Krisher, GM Ignition Switch Fund Rejected 91% of Claims, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 
2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/08/24/gm-ignition-switch-fund/32282521/ 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that the company still “faces 181 wrongful death or injury 
lawsuits due to recalled vehicles in the U.S. and Canada”). 
 13  Everything You Need to Know About the Takata Airbag Recall: What This Recall Means 
to You and What Actions You Should Take, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 3, 2015, http://www. 
consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/10/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-takata-air-bag-
recall/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 14  This Company Just Wrote Off More than Volkswagen, FORTUNE, Oct. 29, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2015/10/29/shell-write-off-charge-loss-earnings/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
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Department of Justice (DOJ) now triggers criminal investigations almost 
immediately after a health, safety, or environmental fiasco hits the national 
news.15 Its eagerness to consider criminal sanctions, which became crystal 
clear as several of the largest car companies in the world admitted to life-
threatening problem after problem, is unprecedented historically.16 
Reliable figures are not available to compare the incidence of white-
collar criminal prosecutions in the health, safety, and environmental areas 
over the last several decades. Anecdotally, apart from a fifteen-year period 
beginning in the late 1980s and lasting into the early 2000s when 
environmental crimes were prosecuted, compliance counseling, civil 
remedies, and neglect prevailed at the agencies and within DOJ.17 Something 
fundamental has changed and my diagnosis of what has caused these 
seismic developments suggests we will see many more of these cases. 
As I have written elsewhere, the primary cause of incidents that are 
increasingly identified as crimes is acute regulatory failure that produces 
weak to nonexistent enforcement as well as widespread corporate disdain 
for regulatory requirements.18 Four converging realities have produced this 
sad state of affairs.19 Budget cuts have hollowed out crucial agency 
functions.20 Constant and opportunistic congressional attacks on agency 
heads have demoralized rank and file civil servants to the point that many 
have developed a kind of muscle memory for abuse that chills aggressive 
implementation of the law.21 Outmoded statutory authority further 
undermines effective enforcement and, although the statutes badly need 
updating, Congress is unlikely to undertake that important, but contentious 
and exhausting, task any time soon.22 Agencies struggle with a rulemaking 
process so congealed that emerging problems remain unaddressed and 
solutions to existing problems remain frozen in time. (We used to call 
rulemaking “ossified,”23 but a stronger term like congealed is obviously 
 
 15  For example, there was a very short gap between the VW admission about defeat devices 
and the announcement of criminal probes. See Davenport & Ewing, supra note 1 (noting that 
the DOJ and EPA began jointly investigating VW shortly after discovery of the defeat devices).  
 16  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, 
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environmental-criminal-law 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (explaining that “[i]t took several years for agencies to implement the 
regulatory programs envisioned under the law,” so “there was little to enforce”).  
 17  Id. (noting that DOJ expanded its work starting in 1987).  
 18  Rena Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”: Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?, 9 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 445–46 (2015). 
 19  RENA STEINZOR, WHY NOT JAIL? INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, CORPORATE MALFEASANCE, AND 
GOVERNMENT INACTION 19 (2015) [hereinafter WHY NOT JAIL?]. 
 20  Id. at 19–21. 
 21  Id. at 19, 37–38. 
 22  Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”, supra note 18, at 445–46. In fairness, having lived 
through the reauthorization of Superfund in 1986 as a House counsel integrally involved in the 
bruising battles that went on for three years to produce a final law, I can attest that 
congressional reluctance to undertake such projects in these polarized times is understandable, 
albeit irresponsible. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).  
 23  For excellent analyses of how the rulemaking process has evolved from ossified to 
congealed, compare Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
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necessary). The direct result is a series of incidents that take lives and 
destroy natural resources. 
Without any question, criminal law is the last resort. Admittedly, it 
closes the barn door after the horses have run free, never giving lives back 
and leaving the aftermath of an incident to be ameliorated at great cost, 
often over periods of several years. Environmental laws were enacted 
because of similar flaws in the tort system, which is far better at 
compensating injury than preventing it.24 Good regulation prosecuted 
aggressively is always a better choice. But congressional conservatives and 
their industry allies have embarked on a highly successful strategy of 
starving and badgering the agencies—even the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the most favored and rebellious among them—into 
quiescence. In the vacuum that remains, criminal prosecutions, especially of 
individual senior executives, have a better potential to deter violations than 
the broken regulatory system. A third goal of the criminal law—what the 
legal historian Lawrence Friedman describes as the setting of “moral 
boundaries” to show a society “where the line lies between good and 
bad”25—is too often overlooked. Its application to renegade companies and 
their well-compensated executives has become extraordinarily important to 
the quality of life in the developed and developing worlds. In sum, until and 
unless the regulatory state is not just revived but greatly strengthened, a 
result that does not seem foreseeable in the near-term, criminal prosecution 
is the best hope for people who believe that the government must redouble 
its efforts to preserve natural resources and protect the public health. 
This observation brings us to two of the biggest corporate scandals of 
all time: the Macondo well blowout that wrecked the Deepwater oil rig and 
VW cheat devices.26 Before delving into the regulatory failures that explain 
those catastrophes and how the criminal law applies to what happened, a 
brief history of criminal prosecutions for environmental violations will 
indicate just how powerful a tool the law can be when used by smart and 
creative prosecutors. 
 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386–87 (1992) (discussing the ossification of informal rulemaking, 
the adverse consequence of this phenomenon, and ways to avoid ossification through tools to 
make informal rulemaking more useful), with Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as 
Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1681–82 (2012) 
(discussing the general characteristics of administrative law as a blood sport and the 
implications of this for administrative law). 
 24  See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States 
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United 
States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 88 (2001) (observing that environmental law challenged limitations 
of tort law that made recovery for environmental harms difficult).  
 25  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (1993). 
 26  Clifford Krauss, In BP Indictments, U.S. Shifts to Hold Individuals Accountable, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at B1; Coral Davenport & Jack Ewing, U.S. Orders Major VW Recall Over 
Emissions Test Trickery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2015, at B2.  
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II. RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERS 
The last time environmental lawyers had a serious debate regarding 
criminal prosecution’s core federal statutes was during the first half of the 
1990s, when the efforts of a specialized group of DOJ prosecutors known as 
the Environmental Crimes Section27 resulted in a sharp uptick in such cases. 
In a nod to the widespread popularity of environmental protection, the 
Section operated independently from the much larger Criminal Division,28 
which meant that these attorneys had the opportunity to elevate the 
substantive mission of the office above DOJ’s broader institutional concerns. 
But when George H.W. Bush took over from Ronald Reagan, a controversy 
erupted regarding allegations that he had suppressed meritorious criminal 
cases.29 President Bush shared President Reagan’s sympathy for business 
concerns at the same time that he sought to establish a legacy as an 
environmental president by supporting historic amendments to the Clean Air 
Act.30 Congressional Democrats seized on the allegations that criminal cases 
were being fixed for the president’s business friends, and Congressman John 
Dingell (D-MI), the powerful chairman of the House Energy & Commerce 
Committee committed the full power of his oversight authority to 
investigating the alleged malfeasance.31 
The debate over the possibility that prosecutors could abuse their 
discretion by reading environmental statutes overly broadly was taken up in 
the academy by an unlikely protagonist. Richard Lazarus—a professor first 
at Washington University School of Law, next at Georgetown Law Center, 
and now at Harvard Law School—had served on the transition team that 
examined allegations regarding the conduct of the Environmental Crimes 
Section for President-Elect Bill Clinton.32 In 1995, he published a landmark 
law review article suggesting that because environmental law was relatively 
new and still being integrated with more traditional legal principles, criminal 
prosecutions were prone to abuse.33 Lazarus was then and is now generally 
perceived to be a liberal who believes in the goals of the statutes, so his 
 
 27  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Environmental Crimes Section, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/ 
environmental-crimes-section (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 28  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, http:// 
www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environmental-criminal-law (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016) (“[T]he Environmental Crimes Section became a fully independent 
Section within the Environmental and Natural Resources Division.”).  
 29  See, e.g., EPA’s Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
1–2 (1992) [hereinafter H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce] (discussing concerns over 
suppression of EPA cases during the Reagan administration). 
 30  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). See Presidential Statement on Signing the Bill Amending 
the Clean Air Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1602 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
 31  See, e.g., H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra note 29 (memorandum from Rep. 
John D. Dingell explaining the Subcommittee’s purpose of investigating alleged malfeasance). 
 32  Richard J. Lazarus, Curriculum Vitae (2014), available at http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/faculty/rlazarus/docs/LAZARUS_CV_12_May_2014.pdf. 
 33 Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2428–40, 2478–
79 (1995). 
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residence on the other side of the ideological spectrum attracted significant 
attention.34 
Lazarus took the position that the “responsible corporate officer” or 
“RCO” doctrine (also referred to as the “responsible relation doctrine”) 
enables prosecutors to presume that defendants should be on notice 
regarding the details of the acts prohibited by law, when all they really know 
is that certain activities are regulated without understanding the technical 
specifics of the rules that apply. 35 He argued that because environmental law 
is quite complex and is based on technical and scientific data that can be 
difficult to digest, executives far removed from the scene where illegal acts 
take place should not be subject to such an extreme assumption.36 The effort 
of understanding environmental law, Lazarus argued, calls for examination 
of a “multiplicity of obscure sources” that are not limited to law as it is 
commonly understood by lawyers.37 DOJ should wait, potentially for 
decades, until environmental law was integrated into more traditional and 
better developed bodies of law before using the heavy weaponry of the 
criminal law.38 
Lazarus was right that the RCO doctrine establishes culpability for 
corporate managers who do not directly participate in criminal activities or 
omissions if those activities are in their area of control and they should have 
known violations were possible.39 So, for example, in one of the two seminal 
Supreme Court cases that established the doctrine, United States v. 
Dotterweich,40 the government prosecuted the president and general 
manager of Buffalo Pharmacal under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act,41 following the shipment of adulterated pharmaceuticals in interstate 
commerce.42 Dotterweich was not accused of actually wrapping the 
packages himself.43 Rather, the government’s theory was that he had failed to 
prevent a very serious public welfare offense.44 The Supreme Court wrote: 
The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of 
people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond 
self-protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the 
legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not 
merely as a collection of English words. . . . Such legislation dispenses with the 
 
 34 Edited Transcripts from the Panel Discussions Held in Phoenix, Arizona on November 
3rd and 4th, 1995, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judicial 
Mandates, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 112 (1996). 
 35  Lazarus, supra note 33, at 2468–71, 2520. 
 36  Id. at 2428–30, 2520. 
 37  Id. at 2478. 
 38  Id. at 2415–20. 
 39  See Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1246 (2006).  
 40  320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 41  21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012). 
 42  Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. 
 43  United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 44  Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. See Aagaard, supra note 39, at 1248–50 (discussing the 
responsible relation doctrine and how it developed in Dotterweich and other case law). 
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conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some 
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at 
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation 
to a public danger.45 
Thirty-two years later, the Court reiterated the RCO doctrine in United 
States v. Park,46 a case affirming the criminal culpability of the president of a 
large national food store chain who received a letter from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) informing him that one of the company’s warehouses 
was infested with rodents.47 Defendant Park delegated the task of eliminating 
the contamination to an underling who neglected to get it done.48 The Court 
explained the RCO doctrine: 
Thus Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing 
sanctions which read and touch the individuals who execute the corporate 
mission—and this is by no means necessarily confined to a single corporate 
agent or employee—the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and 
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement 
measures that will insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of 
foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond 
question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than 
the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of 
authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health 
and well-being of the public that supports them.49 
Because they are seminal cases and the Court was less inclined to write 
mini-treatises on its views when they were decided, Dotterweich and Park 
were ambiguous on one crucial point: whether the Court was trying to make 
it easier for prosecutors to prove that a corporate officer or manager 
harbored a “guilty mind” (mens rea) when an offense was committed or, 
alternatively, whether the justices were accepting the application of criminal 
liability to a class of people who had the authority and power to prevent 
dangerous mistakes that would harm the public. From Professor Lazarus’s 
perspective, however, both possibilities could easily lead to abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion through the indictment of innocent people who did 
not realize that they had done something wrong as defined by impenetrable 
regulations.50 
Lois Schiffer—then Assistant Attorney General for the Environment 
and Natural Resources Division within which the Environmental Crimes 
Section was located and a close colleague of Lazarus—reacted quickly and 
with strong disagreement to his predictions of abuse, arguing that “(1) the 
problems that he identifies are more theoretical than real; and (2) the 
 
 45  Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280–81. 
 46  421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
 47  Id. at 67778. 
 48  Id. at 663. 
 49  Id. at 672. 
 50  Lazarus, supra note 33, at 2487. 
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proposed changes—the consequences of which are largely unconsidered in 
the article—would seriously undermine legitimate law enforcement.”51 At the 
end of the day, as I hope to show in a moment, Schiffer was proven right 
because DOJ’s inherent conservatism drove it to reject the criminal 
prosecution alternative in all but the most egregious cases. 
Unfortunately, the academic literature that followed Lazarus is a mish-
mash of confusing interpretations. Several scholars pursued the argument 
that Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny affect the prosecutor’s burden of 
proving mens rea at the time of the crime.52 They contended that the cases 
make it too easy to climb the corporate chain and indict senior officials who, 
in large corporations, cannot possibly be expected to understand the 
convoluted nuances of health, safety, and environmental offenses.53 They 
claimed that simply by occupying a position of responsibility within a large 
and complex company, executives who are little more than innocent 
bystanders could be held criminally culpable for activities that occur far 
outside the reasonable scope of their knowledge.54 
This alarmist approach is as theoretically flawed as it is factually 
baseless. The RCO doctrine is more correctly viewed as a statement about 
what category of individual defendant is appropriately targeted by the 
criminal law, assuming that the mens rea and actus rea elements of such 
offenses can be independently proven. As Professor Todd Aagaard has 
explained quite eloquently, the doctrine does not supplant proof of mens rea 
but instead imposes a responsibility on senior executives to prevent serious 
violations.55 This interpretation is confirmed by the explicit language of the 
Clean Air Act, which states in a definitional section: “For the purpose of this 
subsection, the term ‘person’ includes, in addition to the entities referred to 
in section 7602(e) of this title [containing definitions], any responsible 
corporate officer.”56 
The criticism that the RCO doctrine undermines fundamental fairness 
by allowing prosecutors to convict on the basis of executive status and not 
actual guilt also overlooks the fact that mens rea is judged by a reasonable 
person standard.57 Or, in other words, prosecutors need not secure a 
confession that a person knew what they were doing was wrong, but rather 
may show, by circumstantial evidence if necessary, that any reasonable 
person would realize that the result of the behavior, including reckless 
indifference to likely consequences, would produce a violent result.58 This 
 
 51  Lois J. Schiffer & James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environmental Criminals: 
A Response to Professor Lazarus, 83 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2531 (1995).  
 52  See, e.g., Lisa Ann Harig, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers 
Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 DUKE L.J. 145, 
147 (1992); Ruth Ann Weidel et al., The Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal 
Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1100, 1105 (1991). 
 53  Harig, supra note 52, at 150–51. 
 54  Id.  
 55  Aagard, supra note 39, at 1253.  
 56  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2012). 
 57  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).  
 58  Id.  
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critical distinction makes it possible for prosecutors to bring criminal 
charges based on willful blindness or recklessness, both long-standing 
varieties of mens rea and of extraordinary importance to the prosecution of 
senior corporate managers in appropriate circumstances.59 
Fast forward twenty years, and we discover that the debate over the 
propriety of criminal prosecutions has been overtaken by events. DOJ 
brought appropriate prosecutions against deserving targets and rarely 
overreached. When it did, trial and appellate courts stood ready to overturn 
convictions, as they have done throughout the nation’s history, especially 
with respect to emerging challenges for the criminal law (e.g., securities 
manipulation, terrorism, and cybercrime). 
Meanwhile, back at the source of the inspections that verify corporate 
compliance or furnish the foundation for civil and criminal enforcement, all 
was not well. The core agencies charged with responsibility to protect public 
health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment were buffeted by 
budget cuts, as well as two waves of very serious efforts to impose 
regulatory reforms that swamped them in waves of new analyses and critical 
White House oversight of their every controversial move.60 As the Tea Party 
and other conservative candidates were elected in large numbers to 
Congress, the first six years of the Obama Administration turned into a 
retreat on many fronts. EPA’s personnel levels are at their lowest level since 
1989, which was before enactment of the most ambitious piece of 
environmental law ever—the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.61 The agency 
plans a forty to fifty percent reduction in inspections and enforcement cases 
over the next five years as a result.62 Climate change legislation failed in 
Congress.63 EPA’s efforts to cut back on ozone, or smog, in the inner city 
were pulled and shelved in advance of the 2010 election.64 The agency’s 
 
 59  For a discussion of these issues, see Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate 
Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990). 
 60  For a thorough discussion of this history and the issues, see generally Rena Steinzor, The 
Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
209 (2012), and RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO 
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO HEALTH, 
SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010).  
 61  Ronald White, Congress Slashes EPA Budget Again Despite Strong Public Support for 
Strengthening Health Protections, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, Jan. 12, 2014, http:// 
www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/congress-slashes-epa-budget-again-despite-strong-public-support-
strengthening-health-protection (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
 62  White, supra note 61. 
 63  Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White House Missed Their Best 
Chance to Deal with Climate Change, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 64  Juliet Eilperin, Obama Pulls Back Proposed Smog Standards in Victory for Business, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-
pulls-back-proposed-smog-standards-in-victory-for-business/2011/09/02/gIQAisTiwJ_story.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016). The standard was reproposed in 2015 but will take many years to 
implement, not least because it has been challenged in court. Coral Davenport, New Limit for 
Smog-Causing Emissions Isn’t as Strict as Many Had Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/politics/epa-to-unveil-new-limit-for-smog-causing-ozone-
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efforts to clarify its jurisdiction over wetlands and other bodies of water that 
sometimes are dry were thrown into a maze of litigation.65 I could go on and 
on. In this fraught space, the kinds of industrial disasters that inspired the 
enactment of the major statutes in the first place reemerged, and the 
criminal law progressed from an alternative implemented only on occasion 
to a mainstay of the enforcement that is so crucial to achieving the 
deterrence of reckless conduct—and therefore the prevention of harm—that 
the laws were intended to deliver. 
I offer two examples of such prosecutions to demonstrate not just the 
importance of the criminal law in restoring momentum on protecting the 
environment but also why the RCO doctrine is so important now and in the 
future. 
III. BRITISH PETROLEUM AND THE OIL INDUSTRY 
The Deepwater Horizon blowout reminds us that although the United 
States has exported a large portion of its manufacturing footprint to 
southeast Asia, we are still engaged in high-hazard enterprises that threaten 
workers, public health, and the environment every day.66 Perhaps the 
greatest danger posed by such activities is the simultaneous downward 
trajectory of the government’s oversight capacity and the oil and gas 
industry’s tolerance of escalating levels of risk. 
A. Dollar Wise and Risk Tolerant 
On the roster of companies responsible for the worst fiascos since the 
advent of industrialization, British Petroleum (BP) overachieves. The 
blowout of the Macondo well and the resulting collapse of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig killed eleven and deposited 4.1 million barrels of crude oil 
into the Gulf of Mexico over the course of eighty-seven days.67 The rig was 
owned by Transocean and leased by BP and they shared responsibility for 
 
emissions.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Devin Henry, Coal Company Sues over “Destructive” 
EPA Ozone Standards, HILL, Oct. 26, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/258129-
coal-company-sues-over-epa-ozone-standards (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 65  Coral Davenport, Obama Announces New Rule Limiting Water Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/obama-epa-clean-water-pollution.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016); Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, HILL, 
June 30, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-states-challenge-obama-
water-rule-in-court (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 66  The best resources for learning about the history of BP’s operations in America and the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster are a documentary by the PBS program Frontline entitled The Spill, 
and a book by a ProPublica reporter who worked with Frontline reporters on that film. See 
Frontline & ProPublica, The Spill (PBS television broadcast Oct. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/; ABRAHM LUSTGARTEN, RUN TO FAILURE: BP 
AND THE MAKING OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER (2012).  
 67  LUSTGARTEN, supra note 66, at 331–32 (noting estimates of 200 million gallons of crude 
released, which rounds to approximately 4.8 million barrels). 
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the disaster.68 But to the extent that any single company dominated the bad 
decisions that led to the disaster, BP was clearly in the lead. 
Remarkably, the Deepwater Horizon disaster was not the first fatal and 
environmentally destructive incident that cast BP as the villain and was 
featured in the national media. In 2005, another explosion at the company’s 
Texas City refinery killed fifteen and injured 180.69 That same month, BP’s $5 
billion Gulf Coast production platform known as “Thunder Horse” tipped at 
a sharp angle toward the sea because a valve was installed backwards.70 In 
March 2006, a pipeline spill deposited over 200,000 gallons of oil on Alaska’s 
North Slope.71 Regulators reached civil and criminal settlements with the 
company, some for amounts in the tens of millions of dollars.72 None made a 
dent in BP upper management’s determination to dominate the global oil 
industry. 
BP CEO Lord John Browne, a larger than life figure who still retains 
great influence in the business world, was determined to transform BP into 
the world’s largest oil company.73 Browne and his management team, 
nicknamed the “Ninja Turtles,”74 acquired companies like Amoco and 
Atlantic Richfield at huge expense and then cut operating costs dramatically 
to reduce the large debt on its books.75 In fact, the Texas City refinery was 
part of the Amoco purchase.76 BP’s top executives were fully aware that the 
plant had been “run to failure” and needed expensive upgrades, but instead 
decided to slash its maintenance and renovation costs to the bone.77 
Soon, warning signs appeared that better financials existed at the 
expense of safe and efficient operations. Hundreds of millions in deferred 
maintenance costs were mounting.78 Equipment that was well past its 
 
 68  Id. at x. 
 69  For an excellent explanation of the causes of that disaster, see ANDREW HOPKINS, 
FAILURE TO LEARN: THE BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY DISASTER (2008). 
 70  Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, A History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, July 
12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 71  Felicity Barringer, Large Oil Spill in Alaska Went Undetected for Days, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/national/15spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 72  For a comprehensive listing of BP enforcement actions, with links to original 
documentation, see Philip Mattera, BP: Corporate Rap Sheet, CORPORATE RESEARCH PROJECT, 
http://www.corp-research.org/BP (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 73  Lyall, supra note 70.  
 74  Roland Gribben, Turtle Triumph as Young Ninja Takes Over at BP, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 
2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2802758/Turtle-triumph-as-young-ninja-takes-over-at- 
BP.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 75  Lyall, supra note 70. 
 76  BP Global, BP Completes Sale of Texas City Refinery, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www. 
bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/bp-completes-sale-of-texas-city-refinery-and-
related-assets-to-marathon-petroleum.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 77  “Run to failure” or “milking the plant” are colloquial terms well known in the business 
community to reflect the practice of neglecting maintenance for long periods until an executive 
on his way up in an organization migrates to a better job and avoids responsibility for 
addressing the steep costs of the practice. See, e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD 
OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 96–97 (2010); WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 83.  
 78  WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 100.  
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expected life became hazardous.79 Because corporate culture was dollar 
wise but risk tolerant, pressure to curtail cost overruns compounded the 
lack of maintenance and training, leading directly to the final denouement. 
B. Blowout 
The Deepwater Horizon movable oil rig was enormous, costing $350 
million, weighing in at 33,000 tons, and looming twenty stories above the 
sea.80 BP paid the princely sum of $1 million per day to lease the rig, 
generating tremendous pressure on midlevel managers to speed up work so 
that challenging tasks of drilling Macondo and temporarily closing the well 
were completed on time.81 But, as so often happens, they were thwarted by 
nature. The Macondo well field posed exceptionally difficult geological 
challenges to the point that workers on the rig started referring to it as the 
“nightmare well” or “the well from hell.”82 
The schedule for completion of the project called for fifty-one days of 
drilling at a cost of $96.2 million, but this deadline had slipped by six weeks 
with a cost overrun of $58 million as of April 20, 2010, the day of the 
blowout.83 That morning, the Transocean crew, in consultation with the 
onsite BP company men and a large group of BP engineers based in 
Houston, Texas, decided they were ready to finish the temporary 
abandonment of the well.84 This operation withdraws the drilling equipment 
and seals the well hole with waterproof cement, but leaves the riser pipe 
that extends from the surface through the ocean floor to the bottom of the 
well in place.85 The Deepwater Horizon would then be towed to its next job.86 
Eventually, BP would install a permanent production platform to extract the 
oil.87 
The Macondo well was drilled to a total depth of 18,360 feet below sea 
level, an astounding engineering feat in and of itself.88 At that depth, oil and 
gas are contained within the earth under tremendous pressure. To prevent 
the “kicks”—or explosive releases—that can occur once drilling reaches 
volatile hydrocarbon deposits, crews pour “drilling mud”—a viscous sludge 
twice the weight of water—down the pipe.89 Drilling mud is constantly 
recirculated in a deepwater well.90 When it reaches the rig, equipment filters 
 
 79  For a description of how this strategy manifested itself in the mid-2000s, id. at 99–126. 
 80  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP 
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 12 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
 81  Id. at 2. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id.  
 84  Id. at 3–4. 
 85  Id. at 7.  
 86  Id. at 4. 
 87  Id.  
 88  Id. at 94.  
 89  Id. at 91–92. 
 90  Id. at 91. 
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out chunks of rock and other debris displaced by the drilling and the mud is 
then pumped back into the pipe.91 The influx and extraction of mud must be 
done very carefully because if the pipe is overloaded, it sways, running the 
risk that it will crack and require rebuilding.92 If a kick occurs and is large 
enough, it displaces the drilling mud and seawater inside the pipes, traveling 
at great speed to the surface.93 It erupts within the rig and can catch fire and 
explode.94 A massive eruption, known as a blowout, is exactly what 
happened on April 20, 2010.95 
After an extensive investigation, the National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Spill (Oil Spill Commission) concluded that the crew 
aboard the rig, and the engineers that were supporting them in Houston, 
Texas, made several critical mistakes in the days leading up to the blowout.96 
Readers with a more technical bent can refer to that report for a detailed 
description of how those mistakes accumulated, causing the destruction of 
the rig. Even more interesting, however, from the perspective of criminal 
culpability, is the management system that produced those mistakes, 
because it exemplifies both BP’s greed and recklessness as an institution 
and the strange way accountability is diffused on board oil rigs and 
platforms. 
Of course, everyone involved in the decision making offshore and 
onshore had a comprehensive understanding of the dangers involved in 
drilling an oil well in very deep water, at least at an intellectual level. 
Temporarily capping a well is as challenging and requires as much care as 
drilling the well in the first place.97 One might suppose that this process 
would be controlled by well-trained teams organized in a hierarchical 
structure with one experienced and specially trained senior person 
responsible for commanding the entire operation. One might also think that 
a team of technical experts would travel to the rig during the critical two-
week period when a well was being closed so that the crew that is normally 
onboard would have adequate supervision. These suppositions are wrong. 
Instead, a kind of Montessori-style free-for-all prevailed, with 
employees from five separate companies contributing little pieces to the 
larger decision-making process without any single individual keeping track 
of how everything fit together.98 No single person had the responsibility and 
authority to ensure a safe and effective operation. Engineering decisions 
were sporadically referred to BP’s onshore engineering unit in Houston, 
often by electronic mail with numerous recipients asked to register any 
disagreement with a judgment.99 Because they were not required to go on 
 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 109. 
 94  Id. at 115. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. at 125. 
 97  See id. at 103–04 (describing the temporary abandonment process). 
 98  Id. at 122–26. 
 99  See, WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 171 (citing Andrew Hopkins, DISASTROUS 
DECISIONS: THE HUMAN AND ORGANISATIONAL CAUSES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO BLOWOUT (2012)).  
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record in support or opposition, some engineers neglected to open the 
lengthy attachments that accompanied this disembodied method of 
communication and never responded to the messages.100 None of these 
people would knowingly risk their own lives, and employees working 
onshore—generally white collar professionals—also had ample incentives to 
prevent a blowout. But, this ad hoc process was acutely dysfunctional. 
BP’s anxiety about costs compounded this very bad dynamic. The Oil 
Spill Commission produced a damning chart of nine “Decisions That 
Increased Risk At Macondo While Potentially Saving Time.”101 Most were 
attributed to BP personnel.102 If one studies the details of BP’s malfeasance 
over time—at Texas City, with regard to its multibillion-dollar investment in 
Thunder Horse, and on the North Slope—the conviction grows that top 
management was fostering the antithesis of a safety culture. Yet as tempting 
as it is to dismiss the entire disaster to BP’s aberrant behavior, as its major 
competitors have suggested, the Oil Spill Commission disagreed. 
C. BP as Rogue 
BP’s high wire act came to an abrupt halt when the Macondo well blew 
out. The company sold $38 billion in assets to pay for spill cleanup.103 It 
signed a criminal settlement resolving multiple counts of federal criminal 
violations, paying a stratospheric $4 billion in fines.104 Two top executives 
lost their jobs in the wake of the spill: Tony Hayward, the company’s chief 
executive officer, and Andy Inglis, his number two, who was in charge of 
business development.105 The reasons why they were fired were never 
attributed to their tolerance of long-term, reckless operations, but instead 
were explained as bad public relations during efforts to contain the spill.106 
 
 100  See David Hammer, 5 Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Gulf Oil 
Rig Blowout, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/ 
2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal_me.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (indicating that BP 
engineers failed to see a warning related to cementing that was buried in a report attached to an 
email). 
 101  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra 
note 80, at 125. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Emily Pickrell, BP’s Pockets are Jingling as Assets Sold, FUEL FIX, Aug. 27, 2012, http:// 
fuelfix.com/blog/2012/08/27/bp%E2%80%99s-pockets-are-jingling-as-assets-sold/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2016).  
 104  Steven Mufson, BP Settles Criminal Charges for $4 Billion in Spill; Supervisors Indicted 
on Manslaughter, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/bp-to-pay-billions-in-gulf-oil-spill-settlement/2012/11/15/ba0b783a-2f2e-11e2-9f50-
0308e1e75445_story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 105  Rob Davies, BP Plays Safe as Inglis Pays Price for Spill, THIS IS MONEY, Sept. 29, 2010, 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/article-1316326/BP-plays-safe-Inglis-pays-price-spill.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Brian Walsh, Oil Spill: Goodbye, Mr. Hayward, TIME, July 25, 2010, 
http://science.time.com/2010/07/25/oil-spill-goodbye-mr-hayward/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 106  Terry Macalister, BP Boss Tony Hayward Faces Fresh Speculation over Losing Job, 
GUARDIAN, June 3, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jun/03/bp-tony-hayward-
speculation-job-loss (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
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DOJ also obtained indictments against BP midlevel managers Robert 
Kaluza and Donald Vidrine, the well supervisors or “company men” aboard 
the Deepwater Horizon, for actions that led to the spill, charging them with 
felony counts for each of the eleven men who died and misdemeanor counts 
under the Clean Water Act.107 In December 2015, the manslaughter charges 
were dropped.108 Vidrine settled with DOJ, but Kaluza is on his way to trial. 
No one higher up the chain of responsibility has been indicted. We will never 
know whether upper-level managers were even investigated, but DOJ’s 
hesitance to enforce the responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is 
very disappointing. 
BP was forced to abandon the dream of becoming the world’s largest 
oil company although it is beginning to return to normal operation 
presumably with far stricter safety protocols.109 Even if it manages to avoid 
another destructive incident, the question is whether the high price of BP’s 
malfeasance is sufficient to deter other giants in the oil industry. BP’s 
competitors have engaged in a blatantly self-serving campaign to persuade 
the public that BP is a rogue, in an effort to discourage more stringent 
regulation of the other oil industry players, and that narrative is as 
comforting as it is illusory.110 
The Oil Spill Commission firmly rejected the rogue hypothesis: 
The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of 
identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such 
systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety 
culture of the entire industry.111 
Congress did not respond to this finding by passing a new law that would 
strengthen the regulatory regime that governs such high hazard operations. 
Nor did it markedly increase the budget of the agency responsible for 
inspecting such facilities, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE), which is located within the Department of Interior. In 
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 110  John M. Broder, Oil Executives Break Ranks and Criticize BP at Congressional Hearing, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A20 (“The chairmen of four of the world’s largest oil companies 
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fiscal year 2014, BSEE had 818 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees who 
were responsible for overseeing deepwater exploration and production in 
the Outer Continental Shelf, which includes the Gulf of Mexico, California, 
and Alaska, including about 3,000 platforms and rigs.112 Offshore wells 
account for seventeen percent of U.S. crude oil production.113 
The failure to dramatically increase oversight of deep well production 
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe is made more troubling 
by the continuous extension of risk. For example, a $3 billion Royal Dutch 
Shell platform called the Perdido, a Spanish word meaning lost, operates 200 
miles offshore in water 8,000 feet deep.114 As Edward Chow, a former 
industry executive who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies told the New York Times: “Our ability to manage risks 
hasn’t caught up with our ability to explore and produce in deep water. . . . 
The question now is, how are we going to protect against a blowout as well 
as all of the other associated risks offshore?”115 
IV. VW’S MANIACAL CHEAT 
If BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster is emblematic of what happens in a 
high-hazard industry when self-regulation prevails, the emerging VW scandal 
demonstrates how a company with overweening confidence in its 
technological prowess and no apparent fear of discovery can pull off what 
can only be described as a regulatory heist. This hubris had what looks in 
retrospect like an amazing run: seven years of escaping detection in a system 
with routine testing and relatively strong enforcement. 
A. Eleven Million Cars, Sixty Premature Deaths, Thirty-Five Percent of Share 
Value, and Counting 
VW’s marketing strategy in the United States was to promote the image 
that it is an iconoclast.116 In the land of lumbering SUVs and stodgy minivans, 
 
 112  See BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2015 3 (2015), available at 
http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/About_BSEE/Budget/00000%20BSEE%20FY%202015%
20Final%20Greenbook%20File.pdf (listing number of FTE employees for FY 2014); see also 
Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Oil and Gas Production Safety Systems 
Proposed Rule, http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/BSEE-Fact-Sheet/Fact-Sheet-for-Safety-
Systems-Proposed-Rule/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting the number of platforms and rigs on 
the Outer Continental Shelf). 
 113  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet, July 2, 2015, http://www.eia. 
gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/data.cfm#petroleum_fuel_facts (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 114  Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises to New Levels as Oil Rigs in Gulf Drill 
Deeper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/business/energy-
environment/30deep.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 115  Id. 
 116  See Dale Buss, Volkswagen Grows Up with New “Why VW” Marketing Campaign, 
FORBES, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/dalebuss/2012/09/18/volkswagen-grows-up-
with-new-why-vw-marketing-campaign/#4b3e705231d5 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (discussing 
VW’s marketing campaign before the defeat devices were discovered, which was meant to 
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it sold frisky, little, fuel-efficient, diesel cars named the Rabbit and the 
Beetle for people who are as proud of their social consciousness as they are 
thrifty.117 The image grew via a series of tongue-in-cheek, deliberately 
humorous advertisements. For example, a television advertisement shown 
during the 2014 Super Bowl shows a jovial dad and his sulky teenage 
daughter riding along in their VW just as the odometer changes to 100,000.118 
The father tells the child that this milestone is very significant and asks what 
she would say if he told her that every time a VW car hits it, a German 
engineer “gets his wings.”119 A chirpy, little, polka-like tune starts to play and 
a series of men in white coats wearing safety glasses and hard hats suddenly 
sprout very large sets of white, feathered angel’s wings with appropriate 
parachute-opening sound effects.120 
Had the brand been less self-consciously righteous, EPA’s public 
announcement at the end of September 2015 that VW had installed software 
that turned off “air emission control devices” (AECD) in 500,000 cars driven 
in America might have inspired somewhat less outrage.121 Yet given such 
strong branding, people felt betrayed as well as cheated. In Europe, matters 
went from bad to worse when the company acknowledged that 10.5 million 
cars were affected worldwide, most of them on that continent.122 Six weeks 
later, another large shoe dropped when the company admitted to 
underestimating emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), a cause of climate 
change, and overstating fuel economy for 800,000 European vehicles.123 EPA 
also announced that it had discovered a second suspect software program 
on 2016 models, although VW denied that the program violated the law.124 
The U.S. DOJ immediately launched a criminal investigation.125 
Authorities in thirty states opened their own inquiries and the plaintiffs’ bar 
filed lawsuits for consumer damages across the country.126 German 
 
“encourage ‘storytelling’ about the VW brand, ‘values’ and vehicles, and to spark social-media 
conversation”). 
 117  For example, characteristics of the Beetle including its technical features, size, and 
shape set it apart from American vehicles. See BERNHARD RIEGER, THE PEOPLE’S CAR: A GLOBAL 
HISTORY OF THE VOLKSWAGEN BEETLE 199, 204–05 (2013) (“The Volkswagen’s success was 
connected to a nascent, middle-class consumer reform movement that began to articulate itself 
in the mid-fifties and castigated conspicuous consumption as wasteful.”). 
 118  See Motoren & Mehr, TV-Spot: WingsVolkswagen Game Day CommercialSuper Bowl 
2014, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8x7NFYHtm8 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Davenport & Ewing, supra note 1.  
 122  Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel 
Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/ 
international/volkswagen-diesel-car-scandal.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 123  Jack Ewing & Graham Bowley, VW Reveals It Misstated Emissions of Gas Cars, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2015, at B1. 
 124  Mike Spector & William Boston, VW, EPA Spar Over Tests, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2015, at 
A1. 
 125  Aruna Viswanatha & Mike Spector, U.S. Widens Net for VW, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2015, at 
B2. 
 126  Danielle Ivory, Volkswagen Is Targeted in Inquiry by 30 States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2015, at 
B2. 
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authorities began their own inquiry, while in Paris prosecutors raided the 
company’s offices and seized computers.127 VW hired an American law firm, 
Jones Day, to carry out an internal investigation.128 Its chief executive officer, 
Martin Winterkorn, resigned a few days after the first scandal broke, and 
was replaced by Matthias Müller, who came from Porsche, another VW 
brand.129 
VW employs 593,000 workers worldwide, and by some accounts is the 
backbone of the German economy.130 The company’s share value fell by 
thirty-five percent within a few days of the announcement.131 The diesel 
scandal may cost the company $7.5 billion and the CO2 and fuel efficiency 
scandal another $2.2 billion.132 Its mother country was thrown into something 
approaching panic, much as Britain had been in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion.133 
At this early stage, details about which VW executives knew what and 
when are not yet clear, although the company appeared to be working hard 
to throw various senior engineers under the proverbial bus to deflect closer 
scrutiny of its marketing, financial, and sales executives.134 Without a doubt, 
skilled software engineers were summoned to the rescue when someone 
senior at the company discovered in 2008 that the diesel models the 
company was counting on to take the American market by storm had AECDs 
that would not allow the cars to pass U.S. tests.135 
“The ‘cheat device’ the engineers designed for diesel cars accomplished 
the feat of informing onboard emissions control technology when the cars 
were subjected to an evaluation of its effectiveness at the independent 
 
 127  Nick Kostov & Jason Chow, Police Raid Volkswagen Headquarters in France, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 18, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-raid-volkswagens-headquarters-in-france-
1445166198 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 128  Ewing & Bowley, supra note 123; Jones Day, http://www.jonesday.com/home.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016) (Jones Day is among the world’s largest law firms, with 2,400 lawyers in 
offices throughout the world.). 
 129  Jack Ewing, Rigged Testing by Volkswagen Fells Its C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, at 
A1, B11. 
 130  Id.; Richard Milne, Volkswagen: System Failure, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2015, http://www.ft. 
com/cms/s/0/47f233f0-816b-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767.html#axzz3rOUsBjp2 (last visited Feb. 13, 
2016). 
 131  Tony Czuczka & Arne Delfs, Volkswagen Too Big to Fail for Germany’s Political Classes, 
BLOOMBERG BUS., Oct. 1, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-01/volkswagen 
-too-big-to-fail-for-germany-s-political-classes (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 132  Ewing & Bowley, supra note 123. 
 133  See Ruth Bender, German Minister Heads to U.S. for Talks on Volkswagen Scandal, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 23, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-minister-heads-to-washington-for-
talks-on-volkswagen-scandal-1445614488 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting Berlin’s concerns 
about the implications of the cheating scandal for the German economy). 
 134  Mike Spector & Amy Harder, Volkswagen U.S. CEO Says He Didn’t Know in 2014 of 
Emissions Defeat Devices, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-u-
s-ceo-says-he-didnt-know-in-2014-of-emissions-defeat-devices-1444316371 (last visited Feb. 13, 
2016). 
 135  William Boston, VW Probe Targets Engineers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2015, at A1, A10; Jack 
Ewing, Volkswagen Engine-Rigging Scheme Said to Have Begun in 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/engine-shortfall-pushed-volkswagen-to-
evade-emissions-testing.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
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testing facilities that periodically certify compliance.”136 The rest of the time 
or, in other words, during every hour of their routine operation, the software 
turned the AECDs off.137 As it turns out, “[a] vehicle’s onboard computer can 
operate in two modes, ‘on road’ and ‘dyno,’” with the second triggered only 
when the emissions are being tested.138 The chief reason why the defeat 
device was necessary on VW cars was that the company wanted to keep 
them light and small, and rejected more sophisticated emissions control 
systems used in heavier vehicles.139 
The existence of the cheat device was discovered almost by accident, 
when researchers at West Virginia University were testing fuel efficiency as 
cars were driven on-road.140 The study was commissioned by a tiny 
environmental group trying to document that European air quality standards 
were more lax than those in the United States.141 Two VW cars happened to 
end up in the initial mix of models subject to the first tests and the 
researchers were startled to discover that the cars gave off pollution 
significantly in excess of the stationary testing standard.142 The researchers 
took their findings to EPA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB).143 
Pinning down the exact nature and location of the cheat devices took 
considerably more time, and eventually VW was informed of the problem.144 
It stonewalled the two regulatory agencies that spearheaded the 
investigation: EPA, of course, and CARB.145 Finally, likely irritated by the 
company’s arrogant attitude, EPA announced its probe and the news 
traveled rapidly around the world.146 
In a sense, the fact that regulators got a tip on the problem from 
independent researchers was a lucky break that does not reflect well on 
their ability to prevent such violations. The discovery would be more 
 
 136  RENA STEINZOR, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: SIX 
CASE STUDIES DRAWN FROM ONGOING PROSECUTIONS TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER AND 
CONSUMER SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (Nov. 2015). 
 137  Andrea Peterson & Brian Fung, The Tech Behind How Volkswagen Tricked Emissions 
Tests, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 
2015/09/22/the-tech-behind-how-volkswagen-tricked-emissions-tests/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 138  Robert Duffer, Volkswagen Diesel Scandal: What You Need to Know, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 
2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/automotive/ct-volkswagen-diesel-scandal-faq-
20150921-story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 139  Umair Irfan, Why Volkswagen Declared Defeat in Diesel Cars, SCI. AM., Oct. 9, 2015, 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-volkswagen-declared-defeat-in-diesel-cars/ (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 140  Sonari Glinton, How a Little Lab in West Virginia Caught Volkswagen’s Big Cheat, NPR, 
Sept. 24, 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/09/24/443053672/how-a-little-lab-in-west-virginia-caught-
volkswagens-big-cheat (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 141  David Shepardson, How VW Got Caught Cheating Emissions Tests, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 
29, 2015, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/foreign/2015/09/24/vw-caught/727 
15074/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Bill Vlasic & Aaron M. Kessler, It Took E.P.A. Pressure to Get VW to Admit Fault, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, at A1, B8.  
 146  See id. 
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reassuring had the regulators discovered the problem on their own. After all, 
the cheat device was in effect for seven years before the company admitted 
it existed, spewing pollution anywhere from ten to forty times national 
standards.147 
Although the media has focused disproportionately on the economic 
implications of VW’s malfeasance, the results of the excess pollution 
sickened people and even triggered premature deaths.148 The pollutant at 
stake in the controversy was nitrous oxide (NOx), a precursor gas that 
combines with volatile organic compounds to produce ozone or, as it is 
more commonly known, smog.149 Excess ozone is primarily a problem in the 
nation’s major metropolitan areas.150 It is such a serious problem that EPA 
recently lowered the levels allowed in the ambient air significantly.151 
The adverse health effects caused by excessive smog are devastating, 
especially to the very young, the elderly, or anyone else with compromised 
respiratory systems.152 A study conducted in 2013 by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s Laboratory for Aviation and the Environment 
found that 200,000 early deaths are caused by ground-level pollution, with 
emissions from road transportation the most significant cause.153 The study 
further found that vehicle exhaust was a factor in 53,000 deaths.154 
In October 2015, a study by scientists at MIT and Harvard University 
concluded that VW’s cheat device, which resulted in pollution ten to forty 
times higher than applicable EPA standards, could result in as many as fifty-
nine deaths in the United States and impose “social costs” (e.g., illness, days 
off work and school) up to $450 million.155 
 
 147  Benjamin Hulac, Volkswagen Uses Software to Fool EPA Pollution Tests, SCI. AM., Sept. 
21, 2015, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/volkswagen-uses-software-to-fool-epa-
pollution-tests/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 148  See Matthew Freeman, The Media Is Missing the Most Important Part of the VW Scandal, 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=02473AAB-E967-042C-660887E119 
56B225 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (stating that hundreds have died as a result of VW’s 
willingness to pollute the air and then lie about it). 
 149  For a general background on this kind of pollution and the adverse health effects it 
causes, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SMOG: WHO DOES IT HURT? WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT OZONE AND YOUR HEALTH (1999), available at http://www3.epa.gov/airnow/health/ 
smog.pdf.  
 150  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Ground-Level Ozone: Basic Information, http://www3.epa. 
gov/ozonepollution/basic.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 151  Coral Davenport, New Limit for Smog-Causing Emissions Isn’t as Strict as Many Had 
Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/politics/epa-to-unveil-
new-limit-for-smog-causing-ozone-emissions.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 152  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Ground-Level Ozone: Health Effects, http://www3.epa.gov/ 
ozonepollution/health.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 153  Fabio Caiazzo et al., Air Pollution and Early Deaths in the United States. Part I: 
Quantifying the Impact of Major Sectors in 2005, 79 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 198, 204 (2013).  
 154  Id. 
 155  Steven R.H. Barrett et al., Impact of the Volkswagen Emissions Control Defeat Device on 
US Public Health, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 114005, Oct. 19, 2015, at 1, 2, available at 
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/11/114005.  
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B. An Eerie Reprise of the Deepwater Horizon 
Although VW’s scheme did not result in a fireball that killed eleven and 
soaked one of the world’s most fragile ecosystems in oil, the central causes 
of that quieter fiasco bear a disconcerting resemblance to the arrogance that 
led to BP’s fall. Figure 1, below, compares those characteristics.156 The chart 
confirms the conclusion of the previous Section: management problems and 
lack of oversight by government regulators played the central role in the 
crises now confronting each company. Both companies were headed by 
larger-than-life CEOs, who were driving to become the largest company in 
their industrial sector, exhibiting the kind of pride that often comes before a 
fall.157 
On November 9, 2015, the international rating service Fitch-Ratings 
(Fitch) downgraded VW’s Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to BBB+ 
from A.158 “The downgrade reflects the corporate governance, management 
and internal control issues highlighted by the ongoing emissions test crisis 
related to up to 11 million diesel-powered vehicles,” Fitch declared in its 
press release.159 It added that the company’s corporate governance was 
“weaker than that of its main peers” because it had a “blocking minority” of 
only twenty percent [on its supervisory board] with respect to “voting 
resolutions,” as well as “potential conflicts of interest on the part of some 
board members, and lack of independence and diversity at the supervisory 
board level.”160 Fitch added that VW had been slow to make changes 
regarding its two boards: one labeled as “management” and a second, with 
superior status, labeled “supervisory.”161 Although it commended VW’s 
voluntary disclosure that it had underestimated CO2 emissions, it said that 
this problem suggested that further bad news was likely to emerge, 
comprising “reputational damage” to the company that could undermine its 
“funding ability.”162 The overall outlook for potential investors was 
negative.163 
VW is controlled by four stakeholders: 1) senior management; 2) private 
investors; 3) representatives of its very powerful union, IG Metall; and 4) the 
governments of Lower Saxony and Qatar, which, along with original 
investors from the families that helped found the company, hold a large 
portion of its shares.164 The company’s executive ranks have been dominated 
 
 156  See infra fig.1. 
 157  VW became the largest automaker in the world when its sales surpassed Toyota’s in 
2014. Jad Mouawad, Volkswagen’s Scandal Further Strains Its Relationship with Its U.S. 
Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, at B2. For further information about Lord Browne’s dream, see 
LUSTGARTEN, supra note 66, at 7. 
 158  Fitch, Fitch Downgrades Volkswagen to “BBB+”; Outlook Negative, https://www. 
fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?id=993669 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 159  Id.  
 160  Id. 
 161  Id.; see also Milne, supra note 130 (explaining the hierarchy of VW’s boards). 
 162  Fitch, supra note 158. 
 163  Id.  
 164  Milne, supra note 130. 
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by the descendants of the families that helped build the company, some 
going back to its creation by Adolf Hitler in 1936.165 The British subsequently 
reorganized the company, and it played a crucial role in Germany’s postwar 
Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle).166 Exacerbating these incestuous 
relationships, the company is supervised by two boards of directors, one 
that advises management and one that is supposed to be a watchdog for the 
company as a whole.167 The vast majority of the members of these boards are 
insiders who have close ties to existing interest groups, their ability to 
change the course of the company is weak, and this structure clearly 
bothered Fitch evaluators.168 
The other source of VW’s managerial weakness, critics charge, is its 
close ties to organized labor, which mean that job losses have been 
“taboo.”169 The result has been that VW is bloated (with 593,000 workers) 
compared to its strongest rival, Toyota (with just 344,000); both companies 
make roughly the same number of cars and until the scandal emerged, VW 
had inched Toyota out of the top spot as largest automaker in the world.170 
“People are starting to question the whole VW system again . . . VW is 
among the most complicated and questionably governed companies,” Hans 
Hirt, a director at Hermes Equity Ownership Services, told the Financial 
Times.171 “In other cases, you have strong families. But here you also have 
state ownership and powerful employees. It is a very special mix.”172 Hermes 
is an activist investor based in Britain.173 
When the defeat device scandal emerged, VW’s top executives took 
quick defensive action: they blamed the company’s engineers. Michael Horn, 
head of the VW Group of America, told Congress that “a couple of software 
engineers” had invented the cheat device.174 “To my understanding this was 
not a corporate decision,” he added.175 “This was something individuals 
did.”176 Until the investigations are finished, this version of reality is difficult 
to dispute, although it is both self-serving and implausible. At a company the 
size of VW, with the usual second-guessing at the mid-management level, 
could two isolated technocrats decide to take such a huge risk—engineering 
a piece of software that deliberately violates American and European law? 
 
 165  Id.; Dietmar Hawranek, The Porsche Story: A Fierce Family Feud, SPIEGEL ONLINE, July 
21, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-porsche-story-a-fierce-family-feud-a-
637243-druck.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 166  Milne, supra note 130.  
 167  Id.  
 168  Fitch, supra note 158. 
 169  Milne, supra note 130 (“Together with the presence of lower Saxony on the board, it 
meant job losses—particularly at VW’s notoriously inefficient main factory next to its 
headquarters in Wolfsburg—were all but taboo.”). 
 170  Id.; Mouawad, supra note 157. 
 171  Milne, supra note 130. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Spector & Harder, supra note 134.  
 175  Id. 
 176  Id.  
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The suspicion that the conspiracy extended further is confirmed by an 
excellent piece of reporting in the Wall Street Journal. VW’s determination to 
push “clean diesel” began a decade ago, under then-CEO Bernd 
Pischetsrieder, who lured executive Wolfgang Bernhard from rival company 
Daimler AG and made him the head of the VW brand.177 Bernhard was also in 
charge of designing a new diesel engine, dubbed EA-189.178 He decided to 
license a superior emissions control system from his old company.179 Called 
“BlueTec,” the system used urea to scrub emissions and was relatively large 
and heavy compared to VW’s homegrown system.180 Its further disadvantage 
was that the consumer had to refill the urea tank periodically.181 As the 
engine design progressed, a corporate putsch resulted in the expulsion of 
Pischetsrieder, and Bernhard left soon after.182 The BlueTec license was 
cancelled, and VW reverted to its own, less effective system.183 Several 
people were involved in that decision, and it is difficult to imagine that when 
the VW pollution control equipment failed to satisfy the American standard 
for NOx, its replacement by computer software was undertaken by a couple 
of engineers in a stealth mission. 
In the end, VW could be charged with any one of a number of crimes, 
including wire fraud (for selling cars that did not remotely justify the claims 
in its many advertisements) and making false statements to the government 
officials. Ironically, the one criminal charge the company and its executives 
are likely to escape is violating the Clean Air Act’s requirement that all cars 
used in the United States have operational and effective AECDs approved by 
the government.184 John Dingell—the longest-serving member of the House 
of Representatives and a staunch ally of the auto industry—made sure 
automakers were exempt, arguing, disingenuously, that civil penalties are 
“easier, speedier, quicker.”185 Fortunately, Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-
Conn.), who is still in Congress and is a former attorney general of the state 
of Connecticut with an excellent record of prosecuting cases to protect 
consumers and the environment, has stated that “[t]he loophole should be 
closed.”186 
 
 177  Boston, supra note 135, at A10. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id.; Irfan, supra note 139 (indicating that diesel engines are traditionally heavier, and that 
VW sought to create a system that delivered both “fuel economy and power” through 
turbocharged direct injection (emphasis in original)); Green Car Reports, Adding Urea to Clean 
Diesel Cars: Can I Just Pee in the Tank?, BUS. INSIDER, May 24, 2011, http://businessinsider. 
com/adding-urea-to-clean-diesel-cars-can-i-just-pee-in-the-tank-2011-5 (last visited Feb. 13, 
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 181  Green Car Reports, supra note 180.  
 182  Boston, supra note 135, at A10. 
 183  Id. 
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Charges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-may-not-face-
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V. CONCLUSION 
Legal historian Lawrence Friedman identifies three goals of the criminal 
law: deterrence, punishment, and the setting of “moral boundaries” to show 
a society “where the line lies between good and bad.”187 The third goal is too 
often overlooked. Its application to renegade companies and their well-
compensated executives has become extraordinarily important to the quality 
of life in the developed and developing worlds. 
But white collar criminal prosecutions are not only important because 
of the immediate effects they can achieve in correcting behavior that harms 
public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment. They are 
also vital to combat the more insidious reality that American justice is no 
longer blind. 
The nation’s 5,000 prisons held about 2.2 million inmates and an 
additional 4.7 million people were on probation or parole in 2013.188 Per 
capita, the United States imprisons 716 out of 100,000 people, more than any 
other nation, including Russia and China.189 African American men are six 
times more likely to be incarcerated than white men.190 Despite constituting 
only thirteen percent of the U.S. population, forty percent of the prison 
population is African American.191 Latinos represent sixteen percent of the 
overall population but nineteen percent of the prison population.192 Whites 
are sixty-four percent of the overall population but only thirty-nine percent 
of those incarcerated.193 
Some might imagine that escalating violent crime rates justify a myopic 
focus on street crime. But the factor that has played the largest role in the 
rapid growth of prisons and prison populations is the relentless pursuit of 
minor drug offenses. Over the decade beginning in 2001, eight million people 
were arrested for marijuana; simple possession charges accounted for 
eighty-eight percent of this total, and marijuana was the target of fifty-two 
 
 187  FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 10.  
 188  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, 2 (2014), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf (providing 2013 data regarding 
prison populations); Christopher Ingraham, The U.S. Has More Jails Than Colleges. Here’s a 
Map of Where Those Prisoners Live, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/06/the-u-s-has-more-jails-than-colleges-heres-a-map-of-where-
those-prisoners-live/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (indicating that the United States has slightly 
over 5,000 prisons). 
 189  ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (2013).  
 190  Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., Sept. 6, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gap-between 
-whites-and-blacks-widens/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 191  Jamal Hagler, 8 Facts You Should Know About the Criminal Justice System and People of 
Color, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2015/05/28/113436/8-facts-you-
should-know-about-the-criminal-justice-system-and-people-of-color/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
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percent of all drug arrests.194 African Americans were 3.73 times more likely 
to be arrested than whites.195 
At the same time, no individual was prosecuted for contributing to the 
2008 recession even as the phenomenon of what has come to be known as 
“mass incarceration” continues to spiral.196 The corrosive notion that some 
financial institutions are “too big to fail”197 quickly morphed into the idea that 
corporations in general may be “too big to jail,”198 further discrediting the 
system. Despite the spike in prosecutions for egregious health and safety 
violations I listed at the outset of this Essay, the most common outcome 
remains payment by corporations of huge fines, dwarfed only by their net 
revenues. 
The clear message of this divided system is that scales of justice, a 
cornerstone of American democracy, have all but abandoned any effort to 
treat rich and poor, white or people of color, the same. As important as clean 
air and water are to all of us, we risk the values that make them possible if 
these profound inequities are not addressed. 
 
 194  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4, 14 (2013), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/090613-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf. 
 195  Id. at 17. 
 196  Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mass Incarceration, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-
incarceration (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 197  ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 539 (2009).  
 198  BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS, 1–2 (2014).  
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Figure 1: The Parallel Odysseys of BP and VW 
Causal Factors BP VW 
Recidivism: 
Both companies had 




executives seemed to 




regulators dished out, 
executives could 
manage as a cost of 
doing business. 
Texas City refinery 
disaster that killed 
fifteen; spill on the North 
Slope of Alaska.199 In the 
case of the Texas City 
refinery, Occupational 
Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) 
regulators agreed to a 
settlement that required 
the company to fix all 
outstanding problems, 
but when OSHA returned 
four years later, they 
discovered that these 
requirements were 
ignored.200 They issued a 
second consent order 
imposing $50.6 million in 
penalties.201 
Cheat devices are well-
known in the auto 
industry. Ironically, in 
1973, just three years 
after EPA was created, 
regulators discovered 
that VW had installed 
cheat devices on its cars 
and EPA imposed a civil 
penalty of $120,000.202 
From 1991–1995, GM 
used a cheat device to 
defeat controls on 
carbon monoxide; in 
1998, Ford installed 
such devices on its 
Econoline vans; in 1998, 
diesel truck owners and 
operators paid $1 billion 
in civil penalties for 
installing cheat devices 
to defeat pollution 
control systems so that 
long-haul truckers could 





 199  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor OSHA Issues Record-Breaking 
Fines to BP (Oct. 30, 2009), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_ 
table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=16674 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 200  Id. 
 201  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, BP to Pay $50.6 Million to Resolve U.S. Labor Dep’t 
Litigation (Aug. 12, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_ 
table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=18156 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 202  Jeff Plungis, Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution Tests, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 23, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/carmaker-
cheating-on-emissions-almost-as-old-as-pollution-tests (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 203  Warren Brown & Pierre Thomas, Emissions Case Costs GM Fine, Cadillac Recall, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 1, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/12/01/emissions-case-
costs-gm-fine-cadillac-recall/ba27a350-1b90-4574-a8c7-2a0ad5312e76/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) 
(explaining General Motor’s settlement over cheat devices); Joby Warrick, EPA: Volkswagen 
Used “Defeat Device” to Illegally Skirt Air-Pollution Controls, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/09/18/epa-volkswagen-
used-defeat-device-to-circumvent-air-pollution-controls/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (referring to 
Ford as an example of automaker’s long history of using cheat devices); Naftali Bendavid, 
Penalty for Truck Pollution: $1 Billion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1998, http://articles.chicagotribune. 
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Causal Factors BP VW 
Driving to Become 
Number One: Both 
companies were led 
by strong, autocratic 
leaders—BP CEO 
Lord John Browne 
and VW CEO Martin 
Winkterkorn.204 They 
brooked no 
opposition in their 
relentless drive to 
become the world’s 
largest oil company 
or automaker. 
Ultimately they were 
successful, but 
success was short-
lived. Both men’s 
strategies involved 
rampant cost-cutting. 
Under the leadership of 
Browne, BP acquired 
competitors (Amoco and 
Atlantic Richfield), was 
quite aggressive in the 
drive to lease property 
where oil might be 
discovered, and as a 
result amassed 
significant debt.205 To 
improve the appearance 
of the company’s 
balance sheets, top 
executive team engaged 
in relentless cost-cutting 
and deferred 
maintenance.206 The 
pressure to cut costs 
was a major factor in the 
Macondo Well blowout 
because temporary 
abandonment of the well 
was weeks overdue and 
BP was leasing the 
Deepwater Horizon rig 
for $1 million/day.207 
VW CEO 
Winkterkorn was 
determined to penetrate 
the American market 
for diesel cars.208 The 
company had two 
problems: consumers 
had little experience 
with diesels and 
American pollution laws 
were significantly more 
stringent than those in 
Europe.209 Having 
decided to reject a more 
expensive and bulkier 
pollution control device, 
VW engineers were 
under tremendous 
pressure to develop the 
cheat in 2007, right 
before the American 





com/1998-10-23/news/9810230110_1_detroit-diesel-corp-engines-mack-trucks (last visited Feb. 
13, 2016) (explaining diesel-engine makers’ settlement over cheat devices). 
 204  Gribben, supra note 74 (describing a memo from Tony Hayward to BP management that 
finds the leadership “doesn’t listen hard enough to what the bottom of the organisation is 
saying”); Volkswagen Executives Describe Authoritarian Culture Under Former CEO, 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/10/volkswagen-
executives-martin-winterkorn-company-culture (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that five 
former executives from VW confirmed Winterkorn’s management style “fostered a climate of 
fear, an authoritarianism that went unchecked partly due to a company structure unique in the 
German motor industry”).  
 205 WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 99–100.  
 206  Id. at 107, 108 (noting that “[i]ndependent reports emphasized the impact of relentless 
cost-cutting directives,” and previous accidents are “attributable to a culture that allowed 
crucial components of the physical plant to ‘run to failure’”).  
 207  Id. at 150. 
 208  See supra text accompanying note 179. 
 209  Boston, supra note 135 (describing American consumers as skeptical of diesel 
technology and American efforts to tighten emissions standards for diesel engines). 
 210  Ewing, supra note 135 (explaining that rather than stopping production of its diesel 
engines and throwing out years of work and investment, VW devised a cheat in 2008 as it began 
a push to market clean diesel technology). 
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Causal Factors BP VW 
Brutal internal 
culture: Even the 
most acute crisis did 
not deflect the drive 
to become number 
one.  
When a new site 
director, Don Parus, 
arrived at the Texas 
City refinery, he 
concluded that the 
facility had $235 million 
in deferred repairs that 
were causing many 
accidents and even 
resulting in unnecessary 
worker deaths. Parus 
even took the drastic 
step of presenting a 
PowerPoint containing 
photographs of workers 
killed in plant accidents 
to John Manzoni, the BP 
Chief Executive for 
refining, and Michael 
Hoffman, group vice 
president for U.S. 
refining.211 Manzoni and 
Hoffman did not yield. 
A few months later, an 
explosion at the 










VW has been enmeshed 
in various scandals and 
internal power struggles. 
Winterkorn, who took 
over as CEO in 2007, 
fought successfully to 
marginalize opponents 
and kept an iron grip on 
the internal operations 
of the company.213 VW 
engineers developed a 
diesel engine they 
claimed would meet 
American standards, 
along the way rejecting a 
more expensive 
pollution control 
technology that would 
have made better 
reductions.214 When they 
discovered in 2007 that 
the engine would not 
meet American 
standards, the engineers 
invented the cheat 
device software.215 
 
 211  Frontline, BP’s Troubled Past, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/bp-
troubled-past/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Ryan Knutson, Blast at BP Texas Refinery in ‘05 
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 212  Frontline, supra note 211. 
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culture-idUSKCN0S40MT20151010 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 214  Dune Lawrence et al, How Could Volkswagen’s Top Engineers Not Have Known?, 
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Causal Factors BP VW 
Foreign Relations 
Implications: BP 
stock part of the 
portfolio of many 
pension funds in 
England.216 VW 
employs close to 
600,000 workers 
worldwide, including 
one in seven German 
auto workers.217 Auto 
industry central to 
health of German 
economy.218 
British government 
lobbied White House 
successfully to drop 
debarment of BP from 
federal government 
contracts in wake of 
Deepwater Horizon 
disaster.219 
VW executives already 
warning that cheat 
device scandal is an 
“existence-threatening 
crisis for company.”220 
Angela Merkel has 
remained at arm’s length 
but may not be able to 
stay on sidelines once 
government and private 
plaintiff cases start 





with regulators after 
the crises erupted 
until they were forced 
to get in line. 
BP fudged and withheld 
how much oil was 
gushing out of the 
blown out pipe for 
many weeks.222 One 
manager was 
prosecuted for lying to 
the government about 
these figures.223 
VW stalled EPA for one 
year, refusing to admit it 
had installed a cheat 
device and insisting that 
EPA and independent 
emissions testing was 
wrong.224 
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